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From segmentarity to opacity: 
On Gellner and Bourdieu, or why Algerian politics 
have eluded theoretical analysis and vice versa 
 
Hugh Roberts* 
Development Studies Institute 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
While there were many differences between Ernest Gellner and Pierre Bourdieu, they also 
had much in common. Both carried out anthropological research in the Maghrib on the 
Berber societies of the highlands and did so at the start of their university careers and at the 
same historical moment, that of the end of French colonial rule and the beginnings of 
Moroccan and Algerian independence. They both subsequently gained international 
reputations through their contributions to contemporary sociological theory, developed in 
both cases through a series of books which were remarkable for the novelty of their 
arguments and the striking manner in which these were elaborated and defended. And, in 
both cases, while eschewing further research in Berber territory, they continued to draw on 
their original fieldwork in the central High Atlas and Kabylia for the empirical material to 
support a wide variety of theories. 
One has only to look at recent social science research by specialists on the Maghrib, and by 
Maghribi scholars themselves, to realise how influential these two thinkers have been over 
the last forty years1. And, after forty years, an overall appraisal of their respective 
contributions to our knowledge of the Maghreb is no doubt due. But this is not exactly what I 
intend to do in this paper. My reason for doing something else is only partly because I 
consider that many of their contributions lie in the field of sociological theory, and that others 
are better placed than I am to give an account of work in this field. For it seems to me that, if 
their writings have made such an impact on their contemporaries and on subsequent 
generations of scholars, it is in part because of the audacity of their hypotheses and thus of 
the extent to which their writings constituted a series of challenges to those who were, or still 
are, inclined to view the social and political realities of North Africa in a different way. And 
if I think that it is time to take up one or two of these challenges, this is in part because the 
negative aspect of the influence of these two great sociologists is now being felt in the area 
which closely concerns me, the political history of contemporary Algeria. 
 
From opacity to segmentarity 
For some years now, and in particular since the horrible massacres of July-September 1997, it 
has been commonplace to hear foreign observers of Algeria complain of the ‘opacity’ of 
Algerian politics. At the same time, we have heard calls for greater ‘transparency’. It was in 
                                                 
* Hugh Roberts is a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Development Studies Institute, London School of 
Economics, University of London. This article was first presented, in French, as a paper to the Colloque 
International sur l’Anthropologie du Maghreb: les apports de Gellner, Berque, Geertz et Bourdieu, held at the 
Institut d’Études Politique, Université Lumière, Lyon, 20-21 September 2001. 
1 In my own case it was with Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians, Boston: Beacon Press, 1962; followed swiftly by 
Jacques Berque, French North Africa: the Maghrib between two world wars, London: Faber, 1967;  and E. A. 
Gellner, Saints of the Atlas, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969, that I began in 1972 my own researches on 
Algeria and the Maghrib, and I consider that I could hardly have found better introductions to the field. 
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the name of this demand for transparency that human rights NGOs and the European Union, 
for example, have invited the Algerian government to admit Special Observers from the UN, 
an invitation which, so far, has invariably been declined. 
 
Given that the opacity of the Algerian political system is a problem, the absence of attempts 
at a serious analysis of this problem is very striking. Neither the foreign and international 
circles who feel or claim to be concerned about events in Algeria, nor the Algerian political 
actors who we may suppose to be inconvenienced by this opacity – opposition political 
parties or human rights groups within the country, for example – have attempted to explain 
this allegedly permanent obstacle to any lucid reading of the political situation in Algeria.  
 
We therefore are faced with two questions: 
· Why this opacity? and 
· Why this inability to account for it? 
 
While one can speak of the opacity of the Algerian political system since independence, there 
can be no doubt that this opacity has increased since 1978, and especially since 1992. As I 
have argued elsewhere2, from January 1992 the Algerian state was reduced to its executive 
branch, given the dissolution of the National People’s Assembly (Assemblée Populaire 
Nationale, APN), and the Communal and Wilaya People’s Assemblies (APC and APW), and 
the increased dependence of the judiciary on the executive as a result of the introduction of 
the state of emergency and the passing of other emergency legislation. Now, the executive of 
any state is normally veiled by official secrecy. The ‘transparency’ of any state or political 
system is a function of the activity of its legislative and judicial branches of the state to the 
extent that they possess real autonomy allowing them to hold those in charge of the executive 
to account for their management of public affairs. There is, therefore, since 1992, a set of 
conjunctural factors which account for some of this opacity.  
 
But these conjunctural factors explain only the aggravation of the opacity of Algerian 
politics. 
 
Before seeking what we might call the objective factors contributing to this opacity, it is 
important to consider the subjective factors that have also been at work. Has the perspective 
of social scientists working on Algerian politics been the right one? Should we not reconsider 
the theoretical perspectives which have been orienting efforts at political analysis? I have 
already answered this second question in the affirmative, by arguing that at the origin of this 
problem lies what we might call a change of direction in the history of the political 
anthropology3 of the Maghrib, a shift which has had a high cost in the long run in so far as 
                                                 
2 Hugh Roberts, ‘Under Western Eyes: violence and the struggle for political accountability in Algeria’, Middle 
East Report, 206, vol.28, no.1 (Spring 1998), pp.39-42. 
3 I would emphasise that we are concerned here with political  anthropology and not anthropology in general: the 
anthropology of religion is in much better shape, as is evidenced by Fanny Colonna’s fine book, Les Versets de 
l’Invincibilité , Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1995; but also Mohammed 
Brahim Salhi’s thesis on the Rahmaniyya (Etude d’une confrérie religieuse algérienne: la Rahmania à la fin du 
XIXe siècle et pendant la première moitié du Xxe siècle, unpublished doctoral thesis, Paris: EHESS, 1979), and 
the value of the use of religious anthropology approaches to the analysis of violence in Algeria has been 
demonstrated by several authors, notably Abderrahmane Moussaoui: ‘De la violence au djihad’, Annales, HSS, 
No.6 (Nov-Dec 1994), pp.1315-1333; ‘La violence en Algérie: des crimes et des châtiments’, Cahiers d’Etudes 
africaines, 150-152, XXXVIII, 2-4 (1998), pp.245-269; ‘Du danger et du terrain en Algérie’, Ethnologie 
française, XXXI, 1 (2001), pp.51-59. We should also mention the contribution of the anthropological approach 
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the advent of structuralist thought - and, in the first place, of segmentarity theory – in 
anthropology has had the long-term consequence of obscuring that history and distorting the 
view taken by contemporary scholars of the analyses developed by the first European 
researchers to study Maghribi political systems, the 19th and early 20th century French 
ethnologists working on Berber political systems in Algeria (Hanoteau and Letourneux, 
Masqueray) and in Morocco (Montagne).4 
 
It remains for me to develop this hypothesis by reviewing some of Gellner’s and Bourdieu’s 
theses about Berber, and particularly Kabyle, political organization. Since I shall be 
criticizing their approaches and analyses on certain key points, I want straightaway to 
emphasise the value of some of their other writings for the analysis of the political situation 
in contemporary Algeria. I shall return to these questions in due course. 
  
Some observations  
Before turning to the arguments of Gellner and Bourdieu themselves, I want first to highlight 
what I consider to be a key, symptomatic aspect of the ‘scholarly’ literature on Algerian 
politics  the absence of any in-depth reflection on Algerian political traditions and the rarity 
of serious attempts to take these traditions into account in the interpretations and analyses of 
Algerian politics since independence. These shortcomings result in approaches marked by 
one or more of the following expedients: 
- the recourse to economic determinist arguments; 
- the recourse to arguments by analogy (with Egypt, the USSR/Russia, Iran, 
Sudan, Afghanistan, Turkey, even Latin America); 
- the recourse to cultural determinism; 
- the recourse to Ibn Khaldun (and especially to the concept of solidarity based 
on blood ties, ‘asabiyya) 
 
At the same time, the almost monopolistic influence of segmentarity theory over 
contemporary Algerian anthropologists is very striking. We see its influence in the 
representations of Kabyle socio-political organization offered by Ramon Basagana and Ali 
Sayad in respect of the Aït Yenni of the central Jurjura5 and by Mohand Khellil for the Aït 
Fliq of maritime Kabylia,6 and Aissa Ouitis’ sketch of the political sociology of the old 
village (thaddarth) of Mansourah in the Biban7 accords perfectly with this theory, 8 while 
Tassadit Yacine’s portrait of the maraboutic community of At Sidi Braham of the Biban 
explicitly claims to be inspired by it.9 Beyond the Berber-speaking areas of Kabylia (Greater 
                                                                                                                                                        
to the richness of the work of Omar Carlier, Entre nation et jihad: histoire sociale des radicalismes algériens, 
Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1995. 
4 Hugh Roberts, ‘Perspectives on Berber politics’, Morocco (Bulletin of the Society for Moroccan Studies, 
London), 3 (1993), pp.1-19; see also the more developed version of this article, ‘Perspectives on Berber politics: 
on Gellner and Masqueray, or Durkheim’s mistake’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute  (new series), 
8:1 (March 2002), pp.107-126. 
5 Ramon Basagana & Ali Sayad, Habitat traditionnel et structures familiales en Kabylie, Algiers: Centre de 
Recherches Anthropologiques, Préhistoriques et Ethnographiques, Mémoire XXIII, 1974. 
6 Mohand Khellil, L’exil kabyle, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1979; La Kabylie, ou l’ancêtre sacrifié, Paris, 
L’Harmattan, 1984. 
7 The Biban mountains are located to the south-east of Greater Kabylia and the south-west of Lesser Kabylia, 
and form a natural barrier between central Algeria (the Algérois) and eastern Algeria  (the Constantinois), 
breached by a narrow defile known as ‘the Gates’ (in Arabic: al-bîbân), whence their name. 
8 Aissa Ouitis, Les contradictions sociales et leur expression symbolique dans le Sétifois, Algiers: Centre de 
Recherches Anthropologiques, Préhistoriques et Ethnographiques, Document No. III, SNED, 1977. 
9 Tassadit Yacine, Poésie berbére et identité: Qasi Udifella, hérault des At Sidi Braham, Paris: Editions de la 
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1987, pp.31ff. 
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and Lesser), Mahfoud Bennoune’s study of the village of El Akbia of the Beni Kaid in the El 
Milia region – one of the numerous communities of Arabic-speaking hillsmen which the 
anthropology of Algeria has unjustifiably ignored – also locates itself openly within the 
framework of segmentarity theory. 10 
 
There are, of course, exceptions: we should cite above all the work of Fanny Colonna, her 
insistence on a non-segmentarist reading of Emile Masqueray, and her very thorough 
questioning of Gellner’s theses on rural Islam. 11 No doubt there are others. But these 
exceptions have not been able to amount to another, clear and explicit, hypothesis about the 
political anthropology of Algeria that might stand as an alternative to the segmentarist thesis, 
which they have tended to skirt around rather than refute, a fact which may explain or even 
justify the assurance with which Mahfoud Bennoune has argued, as one of the fundamental 
premises of the current political drama, for the segmentary nature of the traditional social 
structures of Algeria in general, and not only of this or that particular tribal population. 12 
 
Third, we should note the influence of the idea not only that traditional political organization 
among rural (or at least highland) populations in Algeria, and among the Berbers in 
particular, is ‘archaic’, i.e. superceded if not condemned by history, but that it is based on 
blood or kinship ties, and that its ‘archaic’ character is a func tion of this fact. This influence 
has been clearly demonstrated in Algerian press commentaries on the phenomenon of the 
‘Coordination of ‘aarch, dairas and communes’ in Kabylia since May 2001, commentaries 
which have only compounded the relentless confusion between the register of kinship (blood 
ties, given and immutable) and that of politics (balance of forces, relations of rivalry and 
alliance that are constructed, contingent and conditional) encouraged by analyses of Algerian 
politics which speak of the struggle of the clans inside the power structure of the state, when 
it has always been a matter of factional conflicts, like everywhere else in the executive 
apparatuses of contemporary states.  
 
Fourth, we should note the difference between the fields of Algerian and Moroccan studies in 
this respect. In Moroccan studies, segmentarity theory has long been either: 
- disputed and rivaled by other, French13 and American, 14 approaches; or 
- applied with important modifications, reservations or qualifications;15 or  
- subjected to detailed empirical criticism. 16 
                                                 
10 Mahfoud Bennoune, El Akbia: un siècle d’histoire algérienne (1957-1975), Algiers: OPU-ENAL, 1986, 
pp.22-23.  
11 Fanny Colonna, Introduction to the new edition of Emile Masqueray, Formation des cités chez les 
populations sédentaires de l’Algérie, Aix en Provence: Centre de Recherches et d’Études sur les Societés 
Méditerranéenes, Edisud, 1983, pp.xv -xvi; Colonna (1995), pp.35-69. 
12 Mahfoud Bennoune, Esquisse d’une anthropologie de l’Algérie politique, Algiers: Éditions Marinoor, 1998, 
pp.10-11 & 13-16; the validity of the segmentarist model also seems be one of the premises of the argument of 
Abderrahmane Moussaoui’s interesting article, Moussaoui (1994), p.1331.  
13 See Jacques Berque, Structures sociales du Haut Atlas, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978, 
pp.480ff.  
14 Clifford Geertz, ‘In search of North Africa’, New York Review of Books, 22 April 1971; Dale Eickelmann, 
Moroccan Islam, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977; Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz and Lawrence Rosen, 
Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society , New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
15 Raymond Jamous, Honneur et baraka: les structures sociales traditionnelles dans le Rif, Paris: Éditions de la 
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981; J.D. Seddon, Moroccan peasants: a century of change in the eastern 
Rif, 1870-1970 , Folkestone: Dawson, 1981; Wolfgang Kraus, ‘Contestable identities: tribal structures in the 
Moroccan High Atlas’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (new series), 4 (1998), pp.1-22. 
16 Abdallah Hammoudi, ‘Segmentarité, stratification sociale, pouvoir politique et sainteté’, Hesperis Tamuda, 16 
(1974); Henry Munson, ‘On the irrelevance of the segmentary lineage model in the Moroccan Rif’, American 
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In contrast, in the field of Algerian studies, which has produced not one monograph of socio-
political anthropology to compare with the classic studies of Gellner on the Ihansalen,17 
David Hart on the Aïth Waryaghar and the Aït ‘Atta,18 or Jamous on the Iqariyyen, etc., 
segmentarity theory has never been seriously criticised, disputed or rivalled. All of which 
indicates the extent to which the hegemony of the Gellnerian variant of segmentarity theory 
over the anthropology of Algeria has benefited from the absence of debate over political 
anthropology in this field. It is high time that this hegemony was challenged. 
 
Segmentarity: from modest role to overwhelming ambition 
When researchers working on Algeria turn to segmentarity theory, they often overlook the 
specific factors that at least partially conditioned its particular application by Gellner to the 
peoples of the Central High Atlas region of Morocco. This indifference to the specificities of 
the terrain studied by Gellner should not be attributed exclusively to the excessive taste for 
fashionable models so widespread in contemporary social science, for Gellner’s own line of 
argument encourages it. 
 
Let us first enumerate these specificities. Gellner suggests that the case he is studying, that of 
Ahansal- land, is an exception to a rule, the rule in question being that established by 
Montagne. The region is interesting for a number of reasons: there is a strong religious 
influence on politics, and, moreover, a stable one, while the factions (‘moieties’) that are 
supposed to be characteristic of Berber political life are not to be found.19  
 
Gellner develops the first point through two propositions: 
· the role played by the igurramen (‘saints’) of the Ihansalen lineage and the political 
influence they exercised were so important that the political order in this region 
might legitimately be called a hagiarchy (government by saints);20 
· not only should this political order be distinguished from those existing in the 
Western High Atlas, Anti-Atlas and Rif regions studied by Montagne – both that of 
the small republic governed by the jema’a (assembly) of the taqbilt (canton), and 
that of the great qa’id (El Glawi, El Gondafi, El Mtuggi, etc.), but also the 
oscillation between these republican and tyrannical forms, which was a key 
element of Montagne’s thesis, is totally absent from Ahansal- land; the hagiarchy in 
question, which is neither ‘republican’ nor ‘tyrannical’, is in addition very stable.21 
 
As for the second point, Gellner argues that, even though the word leff (plur. ilfuf), which he 
suggests meant ‘moiety’ in Montagne’s analysis, was known in Ahansal- land and was used to 
signify a political alliance, the ilfuf found there were parochial, informal and ephemeral and 
so bore little or no resemblance to the ilfuf referred to by Montagne - large, formal and 
enduring alliances, extending in a system of binary oppositions, resembling a chess-board, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Anthropologist, 91 (1989), pp.386-400; ‘Re-thinking Gellner’s segmentary analysis of Morocco’s Aït ‘Atta’, 
Man (new series), 28 (1993), pp.267-80. 
17 Gellner (1969). 
18 David Hart, The Aïth Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: an ethnography and history, Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1976; Dadda ‘Atta and his forty grandsons: the socio-political organisation of the Aït ‘Atta of 
southern Morocco, Wisbech, Cambridgeshire: MENAS Press, 1981; The Aït Atta of southern Morocco: daily 
life and recent history, Wisbech, Cambridgeshire: MENAS Press, 1984. 
19 Gellner (1969), p.35. 
20 Gellner (1969), p.35. 
21 Gellner (1969), p.65. 
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over entire regions such as the Western High Atlas, the Anti-Atlas or the Rif. The ilfuf in this 
sense did not exist at all in Ahansal- land.22 
 
To the foregoing we can add at least two further aspects of the specificity of the region. First, 
we should note that one of the factors cited by Gellner as premises of the existence and 
importance of Zawiya Ahansal was what he called ‘the politics of transhumancy’23 arising 
from the fact that each spring, when the snows melted, the Central High Atlas region was 
invaded by the shepherds of the Aït ‘Atta to the south at the very moment that the permanent 
residents of the region had to regulate the access of their own flocks to the high pastures. The 
political ecology of the region, therefore, was an essential element of Gellner’s analysis. In 
these respects – the primacy of stock-raising over agriculture and of a mobile population over 
a sedentary one – the region was, again, very different from those studied by Montagne. 
 
In addition, while Gellner stressed the importance of kinship for individual and group 
identity, he was obliged to recognize that, in the case of the Aït Bu Gmez, who, owning very 
rich land, were the most sedentary tribe of the region, the names of the most important groups 
were borrowed from the topography and the conceptualization of groups in genealogical 
terms obtained only at the lower levels,24 and that this, while locally exceptional, was the rule 
elsewhere, notably in the Western High Atlas. 
 
These very important features of the society of the Central High Atlas which, while linking it 
to the similar - predominantly pastoral - society of the Middle Atlas, distinguish it very 
clearly from the other mountain societies in Morocco, should have encouraged readers of 
Saints of the Atlas to assume that its thesis could not be easily elevated into a ‘model’ to be 
subsequently ‘applied’ to other regions and populations without restriction. They might also 
have led Gellner himself to be prudent about the ambitions he entertained for his analysis. 
But Gellner does not invoke these peculiarities of the region in order to justify his 
segmentarist thesis, while admitting that other theses might be better able to account for the 
political life of other populations. Rather, he cites these peculiarities in support of another 
thesis altogether, namely his explanation of hagiarchy. 
 
The segmentarist thesis in its sophisticated form developed out of the study of societies of 
nomadic pastoralists, notably the Nuer of the British Sudan and the Bedouin of Cyrenaica. 
One might reasonable expect it to be capable also of explaining the transhumant pastoralists 
of Ahansal- land, especially given that (i) earlier studies of Berber political organization had 
never looked seriously at this region, and (ii) certain key features of Montagne’s analysis of 
the Shleuh and the Rifians were absent from it. But this is not at all what Gellner argues in his 
book. If we take the trouble to reconstruct his argument, we shall see that he proceeds as 
follows: 
· segmentarity theory is applicable not only to the Berbers of the Central High Atlas, 
but to all Moroccan tribes, indeed to all tribal populations of the Maghrib as a 
whole;25 
· not only does Montagne’s thesis about the importance of the action of the ilfuf not 
apply to Ahansal- land, but it does not apply anywhere as an explanation of the 
maintenance of order in general;26 
                                                 
22 Gellner (1969), p.66. 
23 Gellner (1969), pp.169-172, see also pp.206-210. 
24 Gellner (1969), pp.40 & 60. 
25 Gellner (1969), pp.28, 35 & 41. 
26 Gellner (1969), pp.66-67. 
 7
· given that all Berber - indeed all Maghribi -  tribal society is segmentary in nature, it 
in all cases needs the ‘saints’ for the interplay between segments to ensure the 
maintenance of order; 
· the peculiarities of the case studied explain only the unusual extent and duration of 
the influence of local saints – the fact that the Ihansalen, unlike most other 
marabout lineages, succeeded in constituting themselves into a hagiarchy over a 
fairly extensive territory and in maintaining themselves over a long period. 
 
 
It is to be noted that at no time does Gellner actually take the trouble to establish his first 
proposition, which is an essential requirement of the second. It is purely and simply an 
assertion, which is supported by no empirical demonstration or theoretical reasoning outside 
of the particular local case studied. His approach, therefore, is an affair of very audacious 
leaps of logic sprinkled as necessary with essentially circular arguments: 
· since Montagne’s analysis does not seem to account for the political life of the 
region, Evans-Pritchard’s interpretative framework suits it better;27 
· the segmentary nature of the social structures of the region having thus been 
established, there is no further need to prove the applicability of segmentarity 
theory everywhere else; 
· given that all Moroccan and indeed all Maghribi tribes are segmentary societies, 
which means, among other things, that no one level of the social structure is more 
important than any other, Montagne’s thesis on the role of the ilfuf  in maintaining 
order among the Shleuh falls to the ground, since it applies (according to Gellner) 
to one level alone.  
 
We are therefore well and truly faced with a line of argument which aims, not only to 
explain the particular case of Ahansal- land, but to appropriate the whole of the political and 
social anthropology of the tribal populations of the Maghrib for the benefit of one theoretical 
model, without any serious demonstration of the model’s applicability to other cases.  
 
Now, this ambition to conquer everything and have it all seems profoundly at odds with a 
remark made by Gellner himself when he writes, of the interplay of the segments and hence 
of the preservation of the cohesion of each segmentary group (or sub-group) by external 
threats, that ‘what defines a segmentary society is not that this does occur, but that this is 
very nearly all that occurs’.28 It should follow that the fact that one can, if one really wants 
to, say of such and such a tribe that it subdivides into ‘segments’ by no means signifies that 
one is in the presence of a segmentary society in the sense given this term by Gellner above, 
that is, a society in which order is maintained by the interplay of the segments and by - very 
nearly - nothing else. This being the case, what entitled Gellner to claim that all Maghribi 
tribal populations are segmentary societies? Very nearly…nothing. 
 
The peculiarities of the society of Ahansal- land which we have already mentioned might 
very reasonably be invoked in support of the hypothesis that the explanation of the 
maintenance of order by the interplay of the segments, supported by the influence of the 
saints, is in fact correct in this particular case, while allowing us to suppose that other 
analyses may better explain the political organization and political life of other Maghribi 
                                                 
27 Gellner himself admits that this is how he came to adopt the segmentarity approach; see his ‘Reply to critics’ 
in J. A. Hall & J. A. Harvie (eds.) The social philosophy of Ernest Gellner, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of 
the Sciences and the Humanities, 48, Amsterdam: Rodophi, 1996, p.645. 
28 Gellner (1969), p.42; see also his reply to Munson in Hall & Jarv ie (1996), p.649. 
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tribal populations, including highland and Berber populations, formed by different histories 
and obtaining their living from other ecological frameworks. It was with this relaxed attitude 
towards my field of study that I approached the analysis of the particular case of Kabylia 
almost thirty years ago. If most of those studying the political anthropology of rural Algeria 
have preferred, implicitly or explicitly, to apply the Gellnerian model, this does not mean 
that their analyses have really conformed to this model. 
 
Some analyses which one might take to be segmentarist when in fact they are not 
I will limit myself to three well-known cases, those of Pierre Bourdieu, Mahfoud Bennoune 
and Tassadit Yacine. 
 
In the portrait he paints of Kabyle socio-political structure in his first book, Sociologie de 
l’Algérie, Bourdieu insists that kinship and genealogy are the sole factors constitutive of the 
group and guarantors of its cohesion, and that this is true at all levels,29 and offers an account 
of Kabyle political organisation that resembles in nearly all respects the segmentarity model, 
although he never explicitly identifies his argument with this. His account differs from the 
Gellnerian model on only two important points. First, rather than arguing, like Gellner, 
following the logic of the segmentary system, that no one level of the social pyramid is more 
important than the others, Bourdieu quite clearly privileges one particular level, that of the 
“simple or complex clan (thakharrubth or adhrum)”, which he describes as “the most vital 
unit”. 30 Second, while sharply downgrading the importance given to the village assembly, 
jema’a, by Hanoteau and Letourneux, 31 in which respect his thinking completely coincides 
with that of Gellner, who had no time for the jema‘at,32 Bourdieu recognizes the importance 
of the sfuf and tries, not without difficulty, to integrate their activities into his analysis,33 
whereas Gellner allowed himself to ignore the role of the ilfuf in Ahansal- land altogether. 
 
As we have already seen, Bennoune, unlike Bourdieu, openly espoused segmentarity theory, 
which he, like Gellner, believed was valid for the whole of Algerian rural society. Yet his 
very interesting historical/anthropological study of the village of El Akbia, of the Beni Kaïd 
tribe of the mountainous hinterland of Jijel in the Arab-speaking North Constantinois region, 
also differs from Gellner’s segmentary model of political organisation. For political 
institutions properly so-called, the jema‘ât and the factions, have a very important role in 
Bennoune’s analysis of local politics, while the mediating role of the ‘saints’ (mrabtin) does 
not seem at all important.34 Not only does Bennoune recognize the role, in every village in 
                                                 
29 Pierre Bourdieu, Sociologie de l’Algérie, Paris: Que Sais -Je?, Presses Universitaires de France, 1958, 3rd 
edition, p.21; the fact that many, if not the majority, of the villages (thiddar and tuwafeq) and ‘tribes’ (‘aarsh) in 
Kabylia have non-genealogical names is not taken into account by Bourdieu. 
30 Bourdieu (1958), p.18. In the more developed version of this chapter presented in the English edition, 
Bourdieu goes further, arguing that, at least in the particular case of the village of Aït Hichem, “(t)he real 
political unit is the clan, adroum’ and that ‘(t)he clan…constitutes the fundamental political unit.” (Bourdieu, 
1962, pp.18 & 20). 
31 Bourdieu (1958), p.23; Bourdieu (1962), p.22; Adolphe Hanoteau & Aristide Letourneux, La Kabylie et les 
coutumes kabyles, 3 vols., Paris: Challamel, 1893 (1st edition 1872-3) vol.2, pp.7-10. 
32 Gellner (1969), pp.89-90. 
33 Bourdieu (1958), p.20; (1962), pp.13-6; see also ‘La maison ou le monde renversé’, in P. Bourdieu, Esquisse 
d’une théorie de la pratique, précédée par trois études d’ethnologie kabyle, Geneva and Paris: Librairie Droz, 
1972, pp.68-69, fn 76, and ‘La parenté comme représentation et comme volonté’, in Bourdieu (1972), p.139, fn 
23. 
34 It should also be noted that at no point did the Beni Kaïd practice the collective oath that was so important to 
Gellner’s analysis of the relationship between the baraka of the saints and the asabiyya  of the lay segments in 
Ahansal-land. 
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the pre-colonial period, of the “assembly or council of elders, or Djemaa”,35 but he also 
claims that the latter “directed the affairs of each community” and was “responsible for all 
the affairs of the whole dachra”,36 and all this seems so self-evident to Bennoune that he does 
not hesitate to state, a little later on in his argument, that “the core of rural political 
organization in pre-colonial Algeria was the djemaa”37 before going on to give an account of 
post-colonial political life in terms of ‘factionalism’, while at the same time presenting an 
interesting sketch of the behaviour of the El Akbia jema‘a and of its relationship to the 
administration of the independent state up to the mid-1970’s.38 
 
Finally, the case of the maraboutic community of At Sidi Braham in the Biban mountains, on 
the edge of Lesser Kabylia, which Tassadit Yacine has brought to our attention in a 
fascinating discussion, seems to me important for several reasons. First, Yacine openly 
indicates her adoption of the segmentarist approach by calling the At Sidi Braham a 
“segmentary grouping” and by highlighting those aspects of the community’s situation and 
surrounding context that recall Zawiya Ahansal: 
· the At Sidi Braham, like the Ihansalen, live in several villages and hamlets whose 
populations are exclusively maraboutic and “form an independent and 
homogeneous ensemble”;39 
· the region is characterised by a degree of aridity and a very low population density 
which make it resemble the Central High Atlas while differentiating it from the rest 
of Kabylia; 
· the main village is situated near a narrow gorge in the Biban mountains, which 
resembles that of Acif Ahansal, in that it has been a necessary passage on the route 
between Algiers and eastern Algeria for generations. 
 
However, when describing the internal politics of the At Sidi Braham, Yacine shows how 
complex they are. We find among these Kabyle marabouts three distinct elements: 
· “the segmentary structure of the Kabyle society to which they belong”; 40 
· “… an organisation into a hierarchy of strata which have unequal access to 
baraka”;41 
· a division into two sfuf that had their origin in the segmentary division between the 
At Abdelhelim and the At M’Hand ou Saïd, but which developed into an 
opposition between supporters of two contrasting points of view and schools of 
behaviour: the imserrhen (‘liberals’) and the ouzmiken (‘rigorists’).42 
 
Now, the combination of segmentary divisions and a hierarchy of strata is not a problem in 
itself, since we also find it at Zawiya Ahansal, which, for the most part, resembles in its daily 
life all other villages in the region. 43 It is because this is a village of igurramen that the 
segmentarity which exists as a backdrop there cannot explain the maintenance of order, 
which relies instead on the hierarchical principle, the ‘unequal access to baraka’, exactly as 
Yacine herself puts it. On the other hand, there is no division into ilfuf at Zawiya Ahansal and 
                                                 
35 Bennoune (1986), pp.27. 
36 Bennoune (1986), pp.27 & 51; dachra  means village. 
37 Bennoune (1986), p.123. 
38 Bennoune (1986), pp.363-87, and especially 368-77 and 378-81. 
39 Yacine (1987), pp.32-3. 
40 Yacine (1987), p.32. 
41 Yacine (1987), p.48. 
42 Yacine (1987), pp.34-5, 39-43. 
43 Gellner (1969), pp.209, 212-3. 
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it is therefore the presence and importance of the sfuf among the At Sidi Braham that should 
intrigue us. 
 
How can this aspect of the organization of the At Sidi Braham be reconciled with Gellner’s 
theory? There are reasons to believe that it is impossible. If we assimilate the binary division 
into sfuf to the ordinary principal of segmentary opposition, as Yacine seems tempted to do, 
then this amounts to admitting that the interplay of the segments determines the maintenance 
of order among these Kabyle marabouts as it does among their ‘lay’ neighbors - whereas it is 
precisely the contrast between obligatorily peaceful igurramen and warlike ‘lay’ tribes on this 
point that is at the heart of Gellner’s argument – and that the At Sidi Braham, far from 
resembling the Ihansalen, differ profoundly from them in their internal organization; thus we 
are already outside the Gellnerian model. If, on the other hand, one considers that the division 
into sfuf  - even if it may to some extent coincide with segmentary membership - cannot be 
explained by the division between segments, but expresses another principle, we are, once 
again, outside the model.  
 
Yacine herself gives us reason to suppose that the opposition between sfuf in this case is not 
at all a specific example of the general principle of order maintenance through the interplay 
of segments.44  
 
First of all, the two segments in question, the At Abdelhelim and the At M’Hand ou Said, are 
unequal; only the former can claim a genealogy which goes back to the founding ancestor, 
and they are also apparently much more numerous than the latter. If the interplay of the sfuf 
merely expresses an opposition between these two segments, it does not conform to the 
segmentary principle of ‘balance and opposition’, for it is very hard to see how there can be 
any balance. 
 
But this does not entitle us to suppose that the opposition between sfuf expresses nothing 
other that the hierarchical principle, because the division into sfuf seems, at least in part, to 
have escaped from its original moorings in the opposition between segments. As Yacine 
explains, some At Abdelhelim ended up rallying to the point of view of the ouzmiken, while 
some At M’Hand ou Said rallied to the imserrhen.45 It follows not only that the functioning 
of the division into sfuf tended to subvert the hierarchical principle, but also that, if this 
evolution in the political orientations of all and sundry result ed in some sort of balance,46 this 
was precisely to the extent that the interplay of the sfuf had broken with the opposition of the 
segments properly so-called and membership of a saff had emancipated itself from kinship 
ties. 
 
I do not claim to know better than Tassadit Yacine what explains the maintenance of order 
among the At Sidi Braham. But I think it is clear that we are not dealing here with a society 
characterized only by the interplay of segments, but with a population whose political life is 
rather complicated and where many different things happen. 
 
But this is equally true for the other cases we have briefly reviewed. Since Gellner’s 
segmentarity theory aims to explain the maintenance of order among the tribal populations to 
                                                 
44 What Gellner called “a kink and variant in the segmentary structure” (Gellner, 1969, p.67). 
45 Yacine (1987), pp.42-3. 
46 I stress the ‘if…’ since this is not at all clear; Yacine’s presentation does not explain how order is maintained 
among the At Sidi Braham, as this is not one of her concerns, which is understandable given that her book, as its 
title indicates, is mainly about Berber poetry and identity. 
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which it is applied, it follows that the analyses offered by Bennoune, Bourdieu and Yacine 
are not Gellnerian and that the societies which these three authors discuss are not segmentary 
in the strong sense which Gellner gives to this term. The moment one breaks with the 
mechanical aspects of segmentarity theory – that is, abandons the attempt to explain the 
maintenance of political order by the interplay of the segments – the segmentary approach 
tends to be reduced to a purely descriptive approach47 which can only account for social 
structure and which can make no more than  a modest contribution to the explanation of 
political organization. 
 
Now, even if we admit that segmentarity is a prominent feature of the social structures of the 
Algerian countryside, we have had to take account of the role of the jema’a in Bennoune’s 
analysis of El Akbia, and of the action of the sfuf in Bourdieu’s and Yacine’s analyses of 
Kabyle political organisation. In all three cases, then, we are dealing with political 
institutions, that is, with the very things which Gellner’s thesis absolutely refuses to 
entertain, because the radical absence of political institutions is one of the fundamental 
premisses of his model. 48 
 
From segmentarity to opacity 
Can a society without political institutions give rise to political traditions? Evidently not. 
 
The opacity of the state, the political system and political life in post-independence Algeria is 
in part due to the fact that its most experienced and well- informed observers lack the frame of 
reference for interpreting the political context and the political action which might enable 
them to grasp effectively the underlying logics of events.49 My hypothesis is that this is 
primarily because, in almost all of the literature on Algerian politics, with only a few 
exceptions, there is never any mention of Algeria’s political traditions. Now, how can one 
hope to explain politics in France, Britain, the US, Russia, China, etc. – but also in Egypt, 
Yemen, Tunisia, etc. – without considering the political traditions of those countries? The 
idea is difficult to defend. But this is essentially what countless observers, commentators and 
analysts have attempted to do in the case of Algeria, and it is hardly surprising that they 
should have generally failed. Instead of trying to conceive what has happened in Algerian 
politics in terms of its own political traditions, there has been a tendency to import ready-
made theories and explanatory models and to apply them to problematics that are often, 
themselves, also imported. From the problematic of ‘feudal lords’ and  ‘fiefdoms’ borrowed 
from the traditions of French revolutionary democracy by some of the authors of the ‘Tripoli 
Programme’50 via that of the new ruling class - the ‘state bourgeoisie’51 -borrowed from 
                                                 
47 Which would justify the critique of the segmentarist approach made by Rene Gallissot & Gilbert Badia, 
Marxisme el Algérie, Paris: Union Générale d’Edition, 1976, p.238, on condition that we note that this precisely 
does not apply to Gellner himself. 
48 Gellner (1969), pp.41-2; see also his article on Masqueray, ‘The Roots of Cohesion’, Man, 20:1 (1985), 
pp.143 & 146, and his reply to Munson in Hall & Jarvie  (1996), pp.649-51. 
49 These logics are to be distinguished from what we might, provisionally and approximatively, call the 
institutional and programmatic logic of, for example, the Boumedienne regime, which was grasped in a 
remarkable way by several analysts, including Jean Leca & Jean-Claude Vatin, L’Algérie politique: institutions 
et régime , Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1975; ‘Le système politique 
algérien’, in Jean Leca, Jean-Claude Vatin, et al., Développement politiques au Maghreb: aménagements 
institutionnels et processus électoraux, Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1979; and Bruno Etienne, L’Algérie, cultures 
et révolution , Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1977; we would also mention the study by I.W. Zartmann, ‘L’élite 
algérienne sous la présidence de Chadli Bendjedid’, Maghreb-Machrek , 106 (Oct-Dec 1984), pp.37-53, which 
grasped much of what was at stake in the early stages of the Chadli regime. 
50 Mohammed Harbi, Le FLN, mirage et réalité, Paris: Éditions J.A., 1980, pp.331-334. 
51Marc Raffinot & Pierre Jacquemot, Le capitalisme d’état algérien , Paris: François Maspero, 1977.  
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Djilas on Yugoslavia and Bettelheim on the USSR52 to the recently canvassed problematics 
borrowing scenarios from Russia (Gorbachev-style perestroika), Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan, 
Turkey, Chile and so on and so forth, the history of critical thought and discourse on Algerian 
politics is in large part the history of a series of approaches which, based on either ignorance 
of or contempt for Algerian traditions - or the refusal, out of embarrassment, to discuss them - 
have all turned out to be dead-ends. It is as if we are confronted with a taboo which is so 
powerful and well-established that it has itself become a national tradition: thinking about 
and explaining Algerian politics in Algerian terms – la yadjouz!53  
 
The influence of segmentarity theory, whose apogée in Maghreb studies almost exactly 
coincided with the first forty years of Algerian independence, has had a lot to do with this. Its 
influence has had a much greater impact on theoretical approaches to Algerian politics than to 
Moroccan politics. In a very interesting book, the American political scientist John 
Waterbury has tried to conceive the political system of post- independence Morocco in terms 
of segmentarity. 54 If few others have followed him down this road, this is, I believe, largely 
because the particular traditions of the Moroccan bled es-siba played only a secondary role in 
establishing the political system of the independent state. The political forces of the towns 
and cities – the bourgeois nationalism (combined with salafi reformism) of the Istiqlal, and 
the monarchy itself – were able to keep the political initiative (even if they were later to 
dispute the leadership0, whereas the forces of the countryside and especially the mountains, 
organized mainly in the Liberation Army and, later, the Popular Movement, only played an 
auxiliary role. In Algeria, it was the other way round. 
 
But let us look at two recent attempts to free the political analysis of Algeria from the 
impasse to which this taboo has led. 
 
In a very penetrating article, Lahouari Addi offers a reading of Algerian politics in terms of 
the logic of the regime, a logic that derives primarily from the role of the army as the 
legitimizing power. Because it is the army that mandates civilians to run the administration 
and the economy, and any ambitious civilian accordingly depends on his privileged 
relationship with a member of the military hierarchy, 
(t)he state…exists in two dimensions: in one, it is visible, official, obedient to rules; 
in the other, it is obscure, hidden from public view, guided by a changing balance of 
forces that only initiates can discern. 55  
 
Here we are right in the middle of the problematic of opacity. Moreover, because the 
Algerian army has inherited its role as legitimating power from its predecessor, the National 
Liberation Army, it is also a question, Addi argues, of “the traditions inherited from the anti-
colonial struggle”.56 But, instead of invoking the particular traditions of the 1954-1962 
revolutionary war to explain how the authoritarian aspect of the state depends on its arbitrary 
aspect, itself a consequence of the lack of institutionalization that Addi mentions, but also a 
characteristic of any opaque regime, Addi emphasizes, rather, how these traditions explain 
the refusal of the army to install an openly military regime and suggests that it is the populist 
                                                 
52 Milovan Djilas, The new class, London: Thames and Hudson, 1957; Charles Bettelheim, La lutte des classes 
en URSS, Paris : Le Seuil-Maspero, 1974. 
53 In Algerian colloquial Arabic: ‘not allowed’, a slogan employed notably by the Algerian Islamists. 
54 John Waterbury, The commander of the faithful: the Moroccan political elite – a study of segmented politics, 
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970; it should be noted that Gellner (in Hall & Jarvie, 1996, pp.654-5) is 
careful not to identify this borrowing with his own model. 
55 Lahouari Addi, ‘Algeria’s tragic contradictions’, Journal of Democracy, 7:3 (1996), p.96. 
56 Addi (1996), p.96. 
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ideology (which, we should note, dates from 1926 and not 1954) rather than its military 
origins that explains the authoritarianism of the state. That populist ideology possesses 
authoritarian traits we can immediately agree. But it seems to me that the originality of the 
Algerian case resides in the fact that the populist tradition not only was the source the 
independence project, but also achieved hegemony in Algerian politics only via the 
revolutionary maquis, a stage in its itinerary which marked it profoundly by aggravating its 
tendencies towards Manichean intolerance (all opposition is treason, or even apostasy) but 
also by grafting onto it the form of behaviour that Mao called ‘commandism’, the arrogant 
and arbitrary elitism fostered by every militarized revolution. 
These considerations are at the heart of an important debate which cannot be pursued in any 
great depth here. But let us pursue the problem raised by Addi concerning the traditions 
inherited by the post- independence Algerian state. This question has also been touched on by 
Bennoune, who argues that: 
the [political] system and the political behaviour of the social forces underpinning 
the political life of independent Algeria are rooted in three traditions: a tradition 
dating from pre-1830 Algeria, a French tradition and a revolutionary tradition. 
Coexistence between the bearers of these three traditions is marked by competition 
as well as cooperation. 
Nevertheless, the lack of synthesis between these three sources of the political 
culture of independent Algeria has led to both latent and overt conflicts that have 
ended up destabilizing present-day Algerian society. 57 
 
I agree with Bennoune that we should try to think about the problem of political behaviour as 
well as that of the political system. Nevertheless, it seems to me that some of his propositions 
need to be nuanced. In particular: 
· the coexistence of diverse traditions in post- independence Algeria has been a matter 
not only of the relationship of different agents representing distinct traditions, but 
also, and perhaps most importantly, of a process taking place in the subjective 
experience of individual Algerians who, in their innermost being, if to varying 
degrees, are worked on by all these traditions and the values they carry. The 
political problem, therefore, does not arise from an absence of synthesis, but rather 
from the fact that the simultaneous or successive attempts at synthesis by a variety 
of social and political actors have given birth to different conceptions of the 
necessary synthesis which are in competition with one another while, at the same 
time, both the criteria and the institutional framework needed if this competition is 
to be arbitrated other than by force have been lacking; 
· Bennoune’s schema of three traditions needs to be corrected, in that we should 
recognise: (i) the contribution of traditions originating in the Middle East; (ii) that 
distinctions should be made, within each of these broader traditions, between their 
diverse and often contradictory elements; (iii) that the revolutionary tradition holds 
a particular and privileged place, precisely in that it is the fruit of a synthesis of the 
other three. 
 
                                                 
57 Bennoune (1998), pp.11-2. 
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Now, in his discussion of the tradition (in the broadest sense) of pre-1830 Algeria, Bennoune 
seems to want to privilege the particular tradition of the Regency, as the only political 
tradition worthy of the name, in opposition to the exclusively social traditions borne by the 
segmentary structures of the Arab-Berber population. 58 In this he is faithful to his choice of 
theoretical framework, but takes no account of the importance he himself accorded to the 
tradition of the village jema’a in his earlier book; what is more, in the passage where he 
discusses the organizational aspects of the revolutionary tradition during the war of 
liberation, we find among these precisely the fact that “the rural populations were organized 
at the local level through popular assemblies or jema‘as”.59 It is possible that several factors 
have combined to inhibit Bennoune from drawing out all the theoretical implications of his 
own observations, but the influence of segmentarity theory is clearly one of them. 
To suppose that the highland societies of Algeria have no political traditions makes it 
impossible  to understand the way of doing things and the internal history of the revolutionary 
movement known as the FLN, and the political system of the Algerian state which the FLN 
constitued.60 To suppose that the highland societies of Algeria had no political ins titutions is 
to make their political traditions impossible to grasp.  
What, then, is a jema‘a? 
 
The denial of institutions  
Gellner acknowledges the existence of jema‘at among the tribes of Ahansal- land, but denies 
them the status of political institutions on the pretext that 
Berber jema‘as have no sense of corporate identity distinct from that of the group 
of which they are the jema‘a; they have no continuity other than that of that group; 
they have, of course, no kind of secretariat or records.61 
 
Let us accept that this may at least appear to be true of nomadic populations which are 
constantly on the move in accordance with the imperatives of transhumance.62 But the facility 
with which Gellner allows himself to generalize from the case of these nomadic pastoralists is 
striking, as is the fact that he never examines the political organization of the large sedentary 
tribe of the region, the Aït Bu Gmez. Now, among the sedentary populations of the Jurjura 
district of Kabylia, the village jema‘a not only possesses its own permanent space and thus its 
own hurma (honour) and ‘anaya (the protection it offers by virtue of the consideration it is 
owed), and thus its own identity, but also its own officers, including a secretary (who is also 
often the treasurer), a town crier and a president, to say nothing of its own clear prerogatives, 
its calendar and internal regulations – procedures, rules of proper conduct, etc. In many cases, 
it also has its own building. If this is not an institution, what does ‘institution’ mean? 
                                                 
58 Bennoune (1998), pp.16-17. 
59 Bennoune (1998), p.54. 
60 I have explained how the political traditions of Algeria’s mountain populations influenced the political 
organization and approach of the FLN in my article, ‘The FLN: French conceptions, Algerian realities’, in 
George Joffé, ed., North Africa: nation, state and region, London and New York: Routledge, 1993, pp.111-141. 
61 Gellner (1969), p.90. 
62 However, it is hard to conceive how any political institution may have any continuity independently of the 
group to which it belongs – that the French National Assembly might have existed before the French nation was 
constituted and might outlast it, for example. 
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In saying all this about the Kabyle jema‘a, I am for the most part simply repeating the 
information given to us by Hanoteau and Letourneux63 and by Masqueray, having taken the 
trouble to verify it on the ground.64 Masqueray is cited by Gellner in his bibliography, and 
Bourdieu cites Hanoteau and Letourneux as well as Masqueray in the bibliographies of 
Sociologie de l’Algérie and of The Algerians. But at no time do either Gellner or Bourdieu try 
to show, by serious reasoning backed up by evidence, that the analyses of their predecessors 
were wrong. There are therefore grounds to believe that we are dealing here with a prejudice, 
or rather two prejudices which it is appropriate to distinguish. 
The first is theoretical: this is the prejudice, intrinsic to structuralist sociology, in favour of 
determinist and reductionist strategies of explaining everything that occurs in the political 
field, in which respect structuralist sociology is the brother as well as rival of historical 
materialism (Gellner’s social thought being a kind of highly elaborated anti-Marxism). 
Within this framework, it is normal to see anything which belongs to the political field as of 
only superficial importance, as ephiphenomenal, since the key to theoretical explanation is 
always to be found in the social structure or the economic ‘base’. But this theoretical 
perspective - which, like any other set of assumptions, we can take or leave - cannot on its 
own explain what has been going on in the two cases which concern us. For structuralist 
thought does not generally lead its proponents to deny the very existence of the political field 
or its institutions; on the contrary, they recognize them, if in a condescending fashion, the 
better to establish their rights over them. Yet Gellner does not want simply to explain the 
political order by the social structure, he reduces the political to the social. He puts his cards 
on the table very early on, during his discussion of Montagne, when he argues that: 
Berber society oscillates between two rival and opposed social forms, between on 
the one hand democratic or oligarchic tribal republics ruled by assemblies or 
hierarchies of assemblies, and on the other hand ephemeral tribal tyrannies, 
exemplified in modern times by the ‘great caïds’ of the South. 65 
 
Here we see Gellner speaking of social forms when clearly it is a case of regimes, and 
therefore of political forms. The society being insufficiently evolved for the distinction to be 
made between the social and the political, the latter is suppressed in favor of the former. 
Gellner’s attempt to persuade us that segmentarity theory finds an essential part of its origins 
in the work of Masqueray66 completely ignores the fact that, in Masqueray’s own analysis, 
the political takes precedence over the social and incorporates it, which is why he compares 
the variety of Berber polity (‘cité’) to the city of classical antiquity.  
 
Why does Gellner choose to suppress the political by submerging it in the social, rather than 
the reverse? This is where the second, social, prejudice seems to come in, that of the urban 
intellectual, 67 who, like Marx, cannot help having a condescending attitude towards rural 
populations. Just as Marx, in The Eighteenth Brumaire, exclaimed, of the French peasantry: 
“they cannot represent themselves, they must be represented”, 68 Gellner - contrary to the 
                                                 
63 Hanoteaux and Letourneux (1893), vol.2, pp.1-10, 21-23, 25-36. 
64 In the course of fieldwork on both the northern and southern sides of the Jurjura in 1973-1974, 1975, 1976 
and 1983. 
65 Gellner (1969), p.26. 
66 Gellner (1985), pp.142-55. 
67 Gellner himself described his family background as “deeply urban”; see John Davis, ‘An interview with 
Ernest Gellner’, Current Anthropology , 32,1 (February 1991), p.63. 
68 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works in One 
Volume , London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1970. 
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whole of this other tradition constituted by the work of Hanoteau and Letourneux, Masqueray 
and Montagne – says, in effect, of the Berbers: “they cannot govern themselves, that is to say, 
manage the ir own conflicts; they need to have these conflicts dealt with by the mechanism of 
their social structure, lubricated as necessary by religious specialists.” 
 
Indeed, it is not only when considering Berber organization that Gellner exhibits this outlook. 
He does essentially the same thing when writing of the contribution of the Salafiyya 
movement or islah to the Algerian national revolution, and of the place of reformist Islam in 
the independent state.69 In his representation of what happened in Algeria between the 1920’s 
and the 1970’s, there is not the least mention of political movements or actors. There is no 
reference to Ferhat Abbas, nor to Messali Hadj and the ENA-PPA-MTLD-OS tradition out of 
which the FLN emerged, nor to the FLN itself (let alone Ben Boulaïd, Boudiaf, Krim, Abane, 
Ben Bella, Boumediène, etc.) His account refers only to the activities of Ibn Badis and his 
allies, and, in the context of the independent state, of the technocratic elite, the “mamluks of 
the modern world”, 70 who are at a disadvantage, in terms of legitimacy, to the devout petty 
bourgeoisie and the Islahist ‘ulama who allegedly represent them. In Gellner’s account of the 
history of contemporary Algeria, political nationalism is cut out of the picture altogether, that 
is, the nationalism of the populist tradition and the maquis, which have no claim to 
consideration in his eyes.71  
 
Are we entitled to attribute to Gellner the same theoretical a priori that is often found among 
orientalist scholars of Islam? This is not certain. His fundamental prejudice seems to be in 
favour of the man of letters rather than the man of religion as such. 72 This, at least, is what 
emerges from two of his occasional writings on independent Morocco that have attracted 
much less attention, although they are of great interest for an analysis of Algerian politics. 
 
In ‘Patterns of rural rebellion in Morocco’, Gellner offers an analysis which seeks to explain 
the logic behind the curious revolts which broke out in the traditional bled es-siba, the Rif 
and the High Atlas, just after independence, insisting that it was not in the least a matter of 
traditional siba, nor of the activation of atavistic sentiments of identity, but rather of 
calculated manoeuvres in the new national political game.73 At a stroke, the highland Berbers 
are recognized by Gellner as having a political life and political behaviour properly so-called 
                                                 
69 Ernest Gellner, ‘The unknown Apollo of Biskra: the social base of Algerian puritanism’, Government and 
Opposition , 9 (1974), pp.277-310, republished in E. Gellner, Muslim Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981, pp.149-173. 
70 Gellner (1981), p.168. 
71 In this brilliant article, in which all Gellner’s erudition as well as his peremptory, indeed Procrustean, 
reductionism are deployed with panache, we can recognise an astonishing anticipation of what the Algerian state 
has now become – on condition that we also recognis e that, in order for the polity to be reduced to this 
condition, it was necessary not only for a new Islamic radicalism to replace the exhausted Badisiyyan tradition, 
but also for the country to burn and bleed for more than ten years, for more than a hundred thousand Algerians 
to be killed, and last but not least, for the tradition of political nationalism to be destroyed together with its 
leading representatives. 
72 This prejudice is itself dependent on a distinction which plays a key role in his social theory overall, that 
between Great and Little Traditions, or between High and Low Culture, between what corresponds more or less 
to urban cultural traditions based on scripturalist learning and teaching on the one hand, and the popular or, 
indeed, peasant cultural traditions, rooted in oral culture, on the other hand; see Gellner (1981), pp.80-81, but 
also E. Gellner, ‘Culture, constraint and community: semantic and coercive compensa-tions of the genetic 
under-determination of Homo sapiens sapiens’, in Paul Mellars and Chris Stringer, The Human Revolution, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989, pp.514-525, republished in E. Gellner, Anthropology and 
politics: revolutions in the sacred grove, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, pp.45-61, 60-61. 
73 E. Gellner, ‘Patterns of rural rebellion in Morocco during the early years of Independence’, European Journal 
of Sociology, 3 (1962), pp.297-311; republished in Gellner (1981), pp.194-206. 
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and, in contrast to Waterbury’s approach, Gellner’s analysis of their political behaviour owes 
little to his own segmentarity theory. There is an irony in this change in perspective, but no 
real U-turn. For what explains Gellner’s willingness to take seriously the political game in 
which his Berbers are involved is the fact that they have been integrated into this via 
clientelist networks, including political parties, which radiate out from the capital and are 
largely the work of educated, urban elites. The irony lies in the fact that it is only when 
Gellner abandons his anthropological hat and reverts to the persona of the sociologist in order 
to look at contemporary Morocco that he frees himself from the reductionist tendencies of 
structuralist sociology and allows himself to describe what is happening in the political field 
in its own terms. 
 
In ‘The struggle for Morocco’s past’, Gellner reviews two books by Moroccan authors who 
offer a striking contrast in terms of their respective polemical strategies and nationalist 
attitudes.74  The first, Les grands courants de la civilisation du Maghrib by Ben Abdallah,75 
seems to reflect the point of view of the traditional bourgeoisie and their ‘ulama, containing 
as it does a preface by Allal al-Fassi. The second, Le gouvernment marocain à l’aube du 
XXème siècle, by Lahbabi,76 is endorsed by a preface from Mehdi Ben Barka, and therefore 
seems to represent a more radical  nationalist, or even left-wing, point of view. Yet, far from 
preferring the first, Gellner furnishes a critique of it which, while courteously phrased, is 
nonetheless scathing, whereas he sings the praises of the second. What is interesting here is 
the criterion on which Gellner bases his judgement. Ben Abdallah’s book is not really a 
coherent argument; it is really more of a collage of retorts to wounding colonialist theses, 
retorts which, for every French criticism of the defects of Muslim civilization in North 
Africa, takes the form of the argument tu quoque. Because this attempt to pay the advocates 
of the colonialist theses back in their own coin cannot seriously hope to convince them, the 
book is a polemic that is more of an internal monologue than a debate with the Other and thus 
an effort, fundamentally conservative in spirit, to nurse a wounded self-respect in order to 
recover a self-confidence that has been lost. In contrast, Lahbabi’s book displays a coherent 
and ambitious argument which, while challenging certain French theses on Morocco, and in 
particular those that attributed an absolute character to the monarchy (a thesis which suited 
the Protectorate), does this not out of amour-propre in order to settle a score with the 
colonialists, but for a far more serious and interesting reason. For its purpose was to develop 
an overall historical vision of Morocco and its political traditions precisely in order to 
establish the premises of a particular political position in the context of the independent state, 
premises which, we should note, are both based on a sophisticated theoretical argument and 
anchored in an imaginative but never romantic reading of national history.  
 
In recognizing the intellectual seriousness of Lahbabi’s book, and its superiority to Ben 
Abdallah’s, Gellner seems to me to demonstrate both his interest in the role of ideas and 
arguments in political life, and a certain impartiality between different tendencies among the 
men of letters. It is because he sees only the Islahist ‘ulama as actors in the field of ideas in 
Algeria that he privileges their role. His blind spot is, therefore, the traditions of thought and 
expression of not only the illiterate, but also the non- lettered, and particularly those of rural 
society. If, in his article on the islah and the Algerian revolution, he uses Fanon as foil to Ibn 
Badis, it is because he does not know the thought of the Algerian revolutionaries, thought 
which was never confided to a public readership because it was never distilled into theoretical 
                                                 
74 E. Gellner, ‘The struggle for Morocco’s past’, The Middle East Journal , XV, (Winter 1961), pp.79-90.  
75 Ben Abdallah, Les grands courants de la civilisation du Maghrib, Casablanca: Imprimérie du Midi, 1958. 
76 Mohamed Lahbabi, Le gouvernment marocain ´ l’aube du XXe siècle, Rabat: Éditions Techniques Nord-
Africaines, 1958, Preface by Mehdi Ben Barka, President of the Consultative Assembly.   
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texts, thought which was hidden because originating in and belonging to the maquis, and it 
never occurs to Gellner that those who do not live by books, but rather by political action, 
could develop original and innovative thinking capable of influencing events. Thus it was that 
the achievement of the Algerian revolutionaries, rooted in the political traditions of the bled 
el-baroud77 – the remarkable synthesis of these traditions with the demands of all these other, 
Algero-Ottoman, French, Arab and Islamic traditions – became inconceivable to social 
scientists. The same thing has occurred in respect of the contemporary academic vision of 
those other unlettered country people who founded a modern state, the Irish revolutionaries. 
 
Evidently, the very different origins of Pierre Bourdieu do not lend themselves in this way to 
explaining his view of Kabyle political organization. One might suppose that his relationship 
to the society of the Béarn peasantry would have allowed and inclined him to get much closer 
than was possible for Gellner to the highland Berbers he was studying. This is at any rate the 
impression given by some of his other writings on Kabyle society, and especially his superb 
article on ‘The sense of honour’, which seems to me to be a great contribution to the 
understanding of Algerian (and not only Kabyle) society and should be a basic reference for 
any serious work on, inter alia, a central aspect of state-society relations in Algeria today, la 
hogra. 
 
Why, then, did Bourdieu reach conclusions similar to Gellner’s about what for Bennoune was 
“the core of rural political organization”, namely the jema‘a? Undoubtedly that same 
theoretical prejudice in favor of structuralist sociology had a lot to do with it. But we should 
also remember that Bourdieu did his fieldwork during the war. At that time, the jema‘a in 
every Kabyle village was either suspended or subordinated to the diktat of the French army, 
or operating under the hegemony of the ALN in a totally clandestine fashion. This was, 
therefore, the worst possible moment to observe Kabyle political life or to try to grasp its 
logic. This, at any rate, is my hypothesis and explains, I believe, why the interplay of the sfuf, 
which continued to characterise the political life of the Jurjura in the 1960s and 1970s,78 was 
never theorised by Bourdieu in relation to the logic of the jema‘a, and consequently seemed 
to him to be an affair of “strange processes of weighing”,79 in short, something frankly 
mysterious, opaque.  
                                                 
77 The Algerian equivalent of the Moroccan bled es-siba; literally, ‘the land of (gun)powder’, i.e. the land of 
fighting, where the central power is resisted. 
78 Hugh Roberts, Political development in Algeria: the region of Greater Kabylia, doctoral thesis (unpublished), 
Oxford University, 1980, pp.241-244, 281-284, 307-332; see also my article, ‘The conversion of the mrabtin in 
Kabylia’, in Ernest Gellner, Jean-Claude Vatin et.al. (eds.) Islam et Politique au Maghreb, CRESM, Paris, 
Editions du CNRS, 1981, pp.101-125. 
79 Bourdieu (1962), p.16. 
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